Directory:Logic Museum/Oxford condemnations of 1277

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The condemnations of 1277 in Oxford were a prohibition enacted in March 1277 against the teaching of 30 propositions in theology, logic and metaphysics enacted by Robert Kilwardby, archbishop of Canterbury, in March 1277. The prohibition was a reaction against the influence of Aristotelian philosophy that had grown as a result of the discovery in the 12th century Latin West of new Aristotelian texts, and through the commentaries on Aristotle by the 12th-century Muslim philosopher Averroes.


Kilwardby’s list contained 10 logical propositions whose teaching was prohibited, as follows

  1. That contraries can be simultaneously true in the same material. (Quod contraria simul possunt ese vera in aliqua materia)
  2. That the sylloigism which is materially defective is not a syllogism (Quod syllogismus peccans in materia non est syllogismus)
  3. That supposition in a proposition is not more for the suppositum than for the significate, and therefore it is the same to say 'every man's donkey runs' as 'a donkey of every man runs' (Quod non est suppositio in propositione magis pro supposito quam pro significato, et ideo idem est dicere, cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit, et asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit)
  4. That an animal is every man (Quod animal est omnis homo)
  5. That a sign does not distribute the subject in relation to the predicate(Quod signum non distribuit subjectum in comparatione ad praedicatum)
  6. That necessary truth depends on persistence of the subject (Quod veritas cum necessitate tantum est cum constantia subiecti)
  7. That there is no demonstration without existent realities(Quod non est ponere demonstrationem sine rebus entibus)
  8. That every proposition about the future is necessary(Quod omnis propositio de futuro vera est necessaria)
  9. That a term with the verb in the present is distributed fo all differences of time(Quod terminus cum verbo de praesenti distribuitur pro omnibus differentiis temporum)
  10. That the inference from the negative of the finite predicate to the affirmative of the infinite predicate follows without the persistence of the subject(Quod ex negativa de praedicato finito sequitur affirmativa de praedicato infinito sine constantia subiecti)