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| − | SUMMA THEOLOGIAE - QUESTIONS VII - X
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| − | [[Directory:Logic Museum/Aquinas Summa Theologiae|Index]]
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| − | *[[#q7a1|Question 7.1 The Infinity of God]]
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| − | *[[#q7a2|Question 7.2]]
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| − | *[[#q7a3|Question 7.3]]
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| − | *[[#q7a4|Question 7.4]]
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| − | *[[#q8a1|Question 8.1 The Existence of God in Things]]
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| − | *[[#q8a2|Question 8.2]]
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| − | *[[#q8a3|Question 8.3]]
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| − | *[[#q8a4|Question 8.4]]
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| − | *[[#q9a1|Question 9.1 The Immutability of God]]
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| − | *[[#q9a2|Question 9.2]]
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| − | *[[#q10a1|Question 10.1 The Eternity of God]]
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| − | *[[#q10a2|Question 10.2]]
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| − | *[[#q10a3|Question 10.3]]
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| − | *[[#q10a4|Question 10.4]]
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| − | *[[#q10a5|Question 10.5]]
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| − | *[[#q10a6|Question 10.6]]
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 pr. </b>Post considerationem divinae perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit infinitus. Secundo, utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum essentiam. Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum magnitudinem. Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum multitudinem. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q7a1"><b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est infinitus. ||Objection 1. It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum. ||Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above (3, 1). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quod ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam. Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum. Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam. ||Objection 3. Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Damascenus, quod Deus est infinitus et aeternus et incircumscriptibilis. ||On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio, ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam, consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem; dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum. Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia, antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate huius rei. Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus. ||I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things. We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above (4, 1, Objection 3). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above (3, 4), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. ||From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 2. Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente in subiecto. ||Reply to Objection 3. The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.
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| − | ||<div id="q7a2"><b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur. ||Objection 1. It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita. ||Objection 2. Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse infinitum. ||Objection 3. Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (3, 8). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio aliquo, ut dicitur in III Physic. Omne autem quod est praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex primo principio. Ergo nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse infinitum. ||On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum quid, sed non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur de infinito secundum quod competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet aliquam formam, et sic materia eius est terminata per formam. Sed quia materia, secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet in potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid, utpote lignum est finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum secundum quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas. Si autem loquamur de infinito secundum quod convenit formae, sic manifestum est quod illa quorum formae sunt in materia, sunt simpliciter finita, et nullo modo infinita. Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam de Angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per aliquam materiam, sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse infinitum simpliciter. ||I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum, unde contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter. ||Reply to Objection 1. It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma non in materia; sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae Angelorum; vel ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus alicuius organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta. ||Reply to Objection 2. The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod materia prima non existit in rerum natura per seipsam, cum non sit ens in actu, sed potentia tantum, unde magis est aliquid concreatum, quam creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam secundum potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas naturales. ||Reply to Objection 3. Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.
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| − | ||<div id="q7a3"><b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid infinitum actu secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim mathematicis non invenitur falsum, quia abstrahentium non est mendacium, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed scientiae mathematicae utuntur infinito secundum magnitudinem, dicit enim geometra in suis demonstrationibus, sit linea talis infinita. Ergo non est impossibile aliquid esse infinitum secundum magnitudinem. ||Objection 1. It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, id quod non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non est contra rationem magnitudinis, sed magis finitum et infinitum videntur esse passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est impossibile aliquam magnitudinem esse infinitam. ||Objection 2. Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum, sic enim definitur continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut patet in III Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni augmentum, videtur quod magnitudo possit crescere in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse magnitudinem infinitam. ||Objection 3. Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, motus et tempus habent quantitatem et continuitatem a magnitudine super quam transit motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra rationem temporis et motus quod sint infinita, cum unumquodque indivisibile signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium et finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod sit infinita. ||Objection 4. Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra, omne corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne corpus superficiem habens est finitum, quia superficies est terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne corpus est finitum. Et similiter potest dici de superficie et linea. Nihil est ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem. ||On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum suam essentiam, et secundum magnitudinem. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset infinitum secundum essentiam, quia essentia sua esset terminata ad aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per materiam. Et ideo, habito ex praemissis quod nulla creatura est infinita secundum essentiam, adhuc restat inquirere utrum aliquid creatum sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem. Sciendum est igitur quod corpus, quod est magnitudo completa, dupliciter sumitur, scilicet mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas; et naturaliter, secundum quod consideratur in eo materia et forma. Et de corpore quidem naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum in actu, manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam substantialem habet determinatam, cum igitur ad formam substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam quantitatem et in maius et in minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod corpus naturale infinitum esse. Hoc etiam ex motu patet. Quia omne corpus naturale habet aliquem motum naturalem. Corpus autem infinitum non posset habere aliquem motum naturalem, nec rectum, quia nihil movetur naturaliter motu recto, nisi cum est extra suum locum, quod corpori infinito accidere non posset; occuparet enim omnia loca, et sic indifferenter quilibet locus esset locus eius. Et similiter etiam neque secundum motum circularem. Quia in motu circulari oportet quod una pars corporis transferatur ad locum in quo fuit alia pars; quod in corpore circulari, si ponatur infinitum, esse non posset, quia duae lineae protractae a centro, quanto longius protrahuntur a centro, tanto longius distant ab invicem; si ergo corpus esset infinitum, in infinitum lineae distarent ab invicem, et sic una nunquam posset pervenire ad locum alterius. De corpore etiam mathematico eadem ratio est. Quia si imaginemur corpus mathematicum existens actu, oportet quod imaginemur ipsum sub aliqua forma, quia nihil est actu nisi per suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti, inquantum huiusmodi, sit figura, oportebit quod habeat aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum, est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur. ||I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude. We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form. Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other. The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod geometer non indiget sumere aliquam lineam esse infinitam actu, sed indiget accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a qua possit subtrahi quantum necesse est, et hanc nominat lineam infinitam. ||Reply to Objection 1. A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra rationem magnitudinis in communi, est tamen contra rationem cuiuslibet speciei eius, scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis bicubitae vel tricubitae, sive circularis vel triangularis, et similium. Non autem est possibile in genere esse quod in nulla specie est. Unde non est possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem infinitam, cum nulla species magnitudinis sit infinita. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati, ut dictum est, se tenet ex parte materiae. Per divisionem autem totius acceditur ad materiam, nam partes se habent in ratione materiae, per additionem autem acceditur ad totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non invenitur infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione tantum. ||Reply to Objection 3. The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod motus et tempus non sunt secundum totum in actu, sed successive, unde habent potentiam permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo est tota in actu. Et ideo infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se tenet ex parte materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non autem totalitati temporis vel motus, esse enim in potentia convenit materiae. ||Reply to Objection 4. Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.
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| − | ||<div id="q7a4"><b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam secundum actum. Non enim est impossibile id quod est in potentia reduci ad actum. Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo non est impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu. ||Objection 1. It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod individuum in actu. Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo possibile est esse infinitas figuras in actu. ||Objection 2. Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, ea quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non impediunt se invicem. Sed, posita aliqua multitudine rerum, adhuc possunt fieri alia multa quae eis non opponuntur, ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum simul esse cum eis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse infinita in actu. ||Objection 3. Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XI, omnia in pondere, numero et mensura disposuisti. ||On the contrary, It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (Wisdom 11:21).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non est impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se, quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et hoc est impossibile esse, quia sic oporteret quod aliquid dependeret ex infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam compleretur, cum non sit infinita pertransire. Per accidens autem dicitur multitudo infinita, quando non requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis, sed accidit ita esse. Et hoc sic manifestari potest in operatione fabri, ad quam quaedam multitudo requiritur per se, scilicet quod sit ars in anima, et manus movens, et martellus. Et si haec in infinitum multiplicarentur, nunquam opus fabrile compleretur, quia dependeret ex infinitis causis. Sed multitudo martellorum quae accidit ex hoc quod unum frangitur et accipitur aliud, est multitudo per accidens, accidit enim quod multis martellis operetur; et nihil differt utrum uno vel duobus vel pluribus operetur, vel infinitis, si infinito tempore operaretur. Per hunc igitur modum, posuerunt quod possibile est esse actu multitudinem infinitam per accidens. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia omnem multitudinem oportet esse in aliqua specie multitudinis. Species autem multitudinis sunt secundum species numerorum. Nulla autem species numeri est infinita, quia quilibet numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem infinitam actu, sive per se, sive per accidens. Item, multitudo in rerum natura existens est creata, et omne creatum sub aliqua certa intentione creantis comprehenditur, non enim in vanum agens aliquod operatur. Unde necesse est quod sub certo numero omnia creata comprehendantur. Impossibile est ergo esse multitudinem infinitam in actu, etiam per accidens. Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in potentia, possibile est. Quia augmentum multitudinis consequitur divisionem magnitudinis, quanto enim aliquid plus dividitur, tanto plura secundum numerum resultant. Unde, sicut infinitum invenitur in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur ad materiam, ut supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam infinitum invenitur in potentia in additione multitudinis. ||I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum secundum modum sui esse, dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit tota simul, sed successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non reducitur in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive, quia post quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in infinitum. ||Reply to Objection 1. Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod species figurarum habent infinitatem ex infinitate numeri, sunt enim species figurarum, trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo infinita numerabilis non reducitur in actum quod sit tota simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum. ||Reply to Objection 2. Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 7 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet, quibusdam positis, alia poni non sit eis oppositum; tamen infinita poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde non est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam. ||Reply to Objection 3. Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 pr. </b>Quia vero infinito convenire videtur quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto, utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei. ||
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| − | ||<div id="q8a1"><b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, excelsus super omnes gentes dominus, et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus. ||Objection 1. It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (Psalm 112:4), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quod est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus, sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi. ||Objection 2. Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things are, rather than He is in any place."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quanto aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet quod sit in omnibus. ||Objection 3. Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus. ||Objection 4. Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Corinthians 6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra, ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus, secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, domine. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus. ||On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Is. 26:12, "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime. ||I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (7, 1). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae, et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit. Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat. Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae naturae. ||Reply to Objection 3. No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione, inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse. ||Reply to Objection 4. In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.
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| − | ||<div id="q8a2"><b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est ubique. ||Objection 1. It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, sicut se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia. Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus locis. Et ita non est ubique. ||Objection 2. Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, quod est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique. ||Objection 3. Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, caelum et terram ego impleo. ||On the contrary, It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." (Jeremiah 23:24).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per modum proprium loci, sicut locata sunt in loco. Utroque autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est in omni loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, sic enim est in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item, locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum, et Deus omnem locum replet. Non sicut corpus, corpus enim dicitur replere locum, inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent omnia loca. ||I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum virtutis. ||Reply to Objection 1. Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis. Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet determinatum situm, non potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel in pluribus locis, et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus, quia habet determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest esse in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est, quod est extra totum genus continui, et hoc modo substantiae incorporeae, ut Deus, Angelus et anima, dicuntur esse indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad continuum sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua virtute. Unde secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et in loco parvo vel magno. ||Reply to Objection 2. The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars, scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci. Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, si autem accipiatur totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et singulis. ||Reply to Objection 3. A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.
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| − | ||<div id="q8a3"><b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus, non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. ||Objection 1. It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, hoc est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. ||Objection 2. Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, sicut Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam. ||Objection 3. Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, sicut gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum in rebus. ||Objection 4. Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God's existence in things.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod Deus communi modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam. ||On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam. In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam, licet non sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam, dicitur aliquid esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius sunt; sicut omnia quae sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse praesentia alicui, qui tamen non est secundum substantiam suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum vero substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo eius substantia habetur. Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei, qui dixerunt divinae potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam. Fuerunt vero alii, qui licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, circa cardines caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat. Et contra hos oportuit dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam. Fuerunt vero alii, qui licet dicerent omnia ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam. Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est. ||I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (12). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power. But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things [Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" (Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence. Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence. Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam, quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est. ||Reply to Objection 1. God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni, scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam. ||Reply to Objection 2. A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero. ||Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 3 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo modo suo loco agetur. ||Reply to Objection 4. No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (III).
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| − | ||<div id="q8a4"><b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei. Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper, materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique. Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse ubique non est proprium Dei. ||Objection 1. It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above (3). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto universo, et ita ubique. ||Objection 2. Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wisdom 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, totum universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique. ||Objection 3. Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, si aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum. Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium Dei. ||Objection 4. Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, anima, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte. Si ergo non esset in mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non est proprium Dei. ||Objection 5. Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, anima ubi videt, ibi sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est. Sed anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum. Ergo anima est ubique. ||Objection 6. Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, quis audeat creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium? ||On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non esset primo ubique, quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae, non convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per se dico id cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens, propter aliquam suppositionem factam, quia sic granum milii esset ubique, supposito quod nullum aliud corpus esset. Per se igitur convenit esse ubique alicui, quando tale est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque loca ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae sunt, oporteret in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum. ||I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed non secundum idem esse. ||Reply to Objection 1. The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se ubique. ||Reply to Objection 2. Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis. ||Reply to Objection 3. The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas partes. ||Reply to Objection 4. If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo quidem, sed per accidens. ||Reply to Objection 5. Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 8 a. 4 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod, dum caelum videt, in caelo videt, et eadem ratione in caelo sentit. Non tamen sequitur quod in caelo vivat vel sit, quia vivere et esse non important actum transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo potest intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum videntis, secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi. Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique. ||Reply to Objection 6. When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.
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| − | ||<div id="q9a1"><b>IЄ q. 9 pr. </b>Consequenter considerandum est de immutabilitate et aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem consequitur. Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis. Secundo, utrum esse immutabile sit proprium Dei. ||
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, spiritus creator movet se nec per tempus nec per locum. Ergo Deus est aliquo modo mutabilis. ||Objection 1. It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Sap. VII dicitur de sapientia quod est mobilior omnibus mobilibus. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo Deus est mobilis. ||Objection 2. Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" (Wisdom 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, appropinquate Deo, et appropinquabit vobis. Ergo Deus est mutabilis. ||Objection 3. Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicitur Malach. III, ego Deus, et non mutor. ||On the contrary, It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" (Malachi 3:6).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum aliquo modo mutari. Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit, sicut quod movetur de albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et sic in omni eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio. Ostensum est autem supra quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex. Unde manifestum est quod Deus moveri non potest. Tertio, quia omne quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud ad quod prius non pertingebat. Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, posuerunt primum principium esse immobile. ||I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above (3, 7) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit et amat seipsum, secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur de mutatione et motu. ||Reply to Objection 1. Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie, secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum. Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per quandam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali; prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a supremis, quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad infima rerum, quae minus participant dicitur esse quidam processus et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius usque ad terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius, cap. I Cael. Hier., dicens quod omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit ad nos a patre luminum moto. ||Reply to Objection 2. Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos vel recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus. ||Reply to Objection 3. These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.
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| − | ||<div id="q9a2"><b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile non sit proprium Dei. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod materia est in omni eo quod movetur. Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut Angeli et animae, non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse immutabile non est proprium Dei. ||Objection 1. It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, omne quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem finem, quod ergo iam pervenit ad ultimum finem, non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam pervenerunt ad ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae creaturae sunt immobiles. ||Objection 2. Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed formae sunt invariabiles, dicitur enim in libro sex principiorum, quod forma est simplici et invariabili essentia consistens. Ergo non est solius Dei proprium esse immutabile. ||Objection 3. Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, solus Deus immutabilis est; quae autem fecit, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia sunt. ||On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid dici dupliciter, uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est; alio modo, per potentiam quae in altero est. Omnes enim creaturae, antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse per aliquam potentiam creatam, cum nullum creatum sit aeternum, sed per solam potentiam divinam, inquantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem ex voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat, non enim aliter eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando; unde si suam actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, ut patet per Augustinum, IV super Gen. ad Litt. Sicut igitur in potentia creatoris fuit ut res essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in potentia creatoris est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint. Sic igitur per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci in esse, et de esse possunt reduci in non esse. Si autem dicatur aliquid mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel in consequendo finem. Si igitur attendatur mutabilitas rei secundum potentiam ad esse, sic non in omnibus creaturis est mutabilitas, sed in illis solum in quibus illud quod est possibile in eis, potest stare cum non esse. Unde in corporibus inferioribus est mutabilitas et secundum esse substantiale, quia materia eorum potest esse cum privatione formae substantialis ipsorum, et quantum ad esse accidentale, si subiectum compatiatur secum privationem accidentis; sicut hoc subiectum, homo, compatitur secum non album, et ideo potest mutari de albo in non album. Si vero sit tale accidens quod consequatur principia essentialia subiecti, privatio illius accidentis non potest stare cum subiecto, unde subiectum non potest mutari secundum illud accidens, sicut nix non potest fieri nigra. In corporibus vero caelestibus, materia non compatitur secum privationem formae, quia forma perficit totam potentialitatem materiae, et ideo non sunt mutabilia secundum esse substantiale; sed secundum esse locale, quia subiectum compatitur secum privationem huius loci vel illius. Substantiae vero incorporeae, quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem huius actus, quia esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non esse, et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt immutabiles et invariabiles secundum esse. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod substantiae intellectuales creatae mundae sunt a generatione et ab omni variatione, sicut incorporales et immateriales. Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum, inquantum virtute sua finita possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant, quod de Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur in omni creatura est potentia ad mutationem, vel secundum esse substantiale, sicut corpora corruptibilia; vel secundum esse locale tantum, sicut corpora caelestia, vel secundum ordinem ad finem et applicationem virtutis ad diversa, sicut in Angelis. Et universaliter omnes creaturae communiter sunt mutabiles secundum potentiam creantis, in cuius potestate est esse et non esse earum. Unde, cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, proprium eius est omnino immutabilem esse. ||I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of another--namely, of God--they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence. If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above (8, 2). Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est mutabile secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale, de tali enim motu philosophi tractaverunt. ||Reply to Objection 1. This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod Angeli boni, supra immutabilitatem essendi, quae competit eis secundum naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex divina virtute, tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum locum. ||Reply to Objection 2. The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 9 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod formae dicuntur invariabiles, quia non possunt esse subiectum variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi, sed quia eis aliquid est. ||Reply to Objection 3. Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.
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| − | ||<div id="q10a1"><b>IЄ q. 10 pr. </b>Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit aeternitas. Secundo, utrum Deus sit aeternus. Tertio, utrum esse aeternum sit proprium Dei. Quarto, utrum aeternitas differat a tempore. Quinto, de differentia aevi et temporis. Sexto, utrum sit unum aevum tantum, sicut est unum tempus et una aeternitas. ||
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1 </b>Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis, quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio. Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod aeternitati non competit. Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile. ||Objection 1. It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought not to be found.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse. ||Objection 2. Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, totum dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota. ||Objection 3. Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be "whole."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim Micheae V, egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis; et ad Rom., XVI cap., secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus aeternis taciti. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul. ||Objection 4. Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" (Romans 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5 </b>Praeterea, totum et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit tota, superflue additur quod sit perfecta. ||Objection 5. Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described as "perfect."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6 </b>Praeterea, possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio. ||Objection 6. Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu, apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu, et semper eodem modo se habet, non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis. Item, ea dicuntur tempore mensurari, quae principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic., et hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur est accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem habere potest. Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur). Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul existens. ||I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity. Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end. Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable--that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis. ||Reply to Objection 1. Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus motus. ||Reply to Objection 2. What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed inquantum nihil ei deest. ||Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas, tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis. ||Reply to Objection 4. As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 ad 5 </b>Ad quintum dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis. ||Reply to Objection 5. Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 1 ad 6 </b>Ad sextum dicendum quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis, usus est nomine possessionis. ||Reply to Objection 6. Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word "possession."
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| − | ||<div id="q10a2"><b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1 </b>Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim Boetius quod nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aeternitatem; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est aeternus. ||Objection 1. It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, quod est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra. Ergo esse aeternum non convenit Deo. ||Objection 2. Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (Exodus 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum. ||Objection 3. Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, in aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est aeternus. ||Objection 4. Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius, aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus spiritus sanctus. ||On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas. ||I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in nobis apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc stans. Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam immutabilitatem. ||Reply to Objection 1. The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 ad 2 </b>Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur, quod intelligentia parificatur aeternitati. Quod autem dicitur in Exodo, dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra sciendum quod aeternum accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia durat ultra quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem datam, nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet rei, ut dicitur in libro I de caelo. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aeternum regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum eius regnum est totum simul. ||Reply to Objection 2. From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram tantum. ||Reply to Objection 3. Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 2 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per praesens, praeteritum et futurum. ||Reply to Objection 4. Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future.
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| − | ||<div id="q10a3"><b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1 </b>Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium. Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod qui ad iustitiam erudiunt plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates. Non autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non igitur solus Deus est aeternus. ||Objection 1. It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [Douay: 'for all eternity']" (Daniel 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, Matth. XXV dicitur, ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum. Non igitur solus Deus est aeternus. ||Objection 2. Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" (Matthew 25:41). Therefore God is not the only eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, omne necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae. Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus. ||Objection 3. Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, Deus solus est qui exordium non habet. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum. Solus ergo Deus est aeternus. ||On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua eius aeternitatem participant. Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc immutabilitatem sortiuntur a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt, et secundum hoc dicitur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat. Quaedam etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem durationis, licet corruptibilia sint, sicut in Psalmo dicuntur montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur, de pomis collium aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant de ratione aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut Angeli et beati, qui verbo fruuntur, quia quantum ad illam visionem verbi, non sunt in sanctis volubiles cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin. Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum illud Ioann. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant et cetera. ||I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (9, 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" (Ecclesiastes 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Psalm 75:5) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (Deuteronomy 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (John 17:3).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione. ||Reply to Objection 1. There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio, secundum illud Iob XXIV, ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis nivium. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, erit tempus eorum in saecula. ||Reply to Objection 2. The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for ever" (Psalm 80:16).
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 3 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum autem, secundum philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu. Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum. ||Reply to Objection 3. Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.
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| − | ||<div id="q10a4"><b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1 </b>Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore. Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate. ||Objection 1. It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis, quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis. Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud secundum substantiam a tempore. ||Objection 2. Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, sicut mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum. Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas, vel aliquid aeternitatis. ||Objection 3. Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being--that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem. ||On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen praedicta differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet principium et finem in tempore. Potest tamen et aliam rationem habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et principium in potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem, accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo, differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem tempus. ||I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est tempus et aeternitas mensura. ||Reply to Objection 1. Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem quod nunc temporis. ||Reply to Objection 2. The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 4 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse, ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est moveri, et non movetur. ||Reply to Objection 3. As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.
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| − | ||<div id="q10a5"><b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1 </b>Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo. ||Objection 1. It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, de ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius, de ratione vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum non est aeternitas, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et posterius, et ita est tempus. ||Objection 2. Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Sirach 1:1) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it is the same as time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, si in aevo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aeviternis non differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit impossibile aeviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea non futura esse. Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in nihilum. ||Objection 3. Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, cum duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex parte post, si aevum sit totum simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu, quod est impossibile. Non igitur aevum differt a tempore. ||Objection 4. Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 s. c. </b>Sed contra est quod dicit Boetius, qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes. ||On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod aevum differt a tempore et ab aeternitate, sicut medium existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant, dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec differentia est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est, quia si etiam semper aeviterna fuissent et semper futura essent, ut aliqui ponunt; vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et tempore. Alii vero assignant differentiam inter haec tria, per hoc quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem habet prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione; aevum habet prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed haec positio implicat contradictoria. Quod quidem manifeste apparet, si innovatio et veteratio referantur ad ipsam mensuram. Cum enim prius et posterius durationis non possint esse simul, si aevum habet prius et posterius, oportet quod, priore parte aevi recedente, posterior de novo adveniat, et sic erit innovatio in ipso aevo, sicut in tempore. Si vero referantur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur inconveniens. Ex hoc enim res temporalis inveteratur tempore, quod habet esse transmutabile, et ex transmutabilitate mensurati, est prius et posterius in mensura, ut patet ex IV Physic. Si igitur ipsum aeviternum non sit inveterabile nec innovabile, hoc erit quia esse eius est intransmutabile. Mensura ergo eius non habebit prius et posterius. Est ergo dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subiectum transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit, et huiusmodi mensurantur tempore; sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subiectum transmutationis, tamen habent transmutationem adiunctam, vel in actu vel in potentia. Sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, quorum esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum. Et similiter patet de Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet; et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum, et locorum suo modo. Et ideo huiusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adiunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet prius et posterius, aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius, sed ei coniungi possunt, aeternitas autem non habet prius neque posterius, neque ea compatitur. ||I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time. Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae spirituales, quantum ad affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde et Augustinus ibidem dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, mensurantur aevo. Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant aeternitatem. ||Reply to Objection 1. Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas, quia compatitur secum prius et posterius. ||Reply to Objection 2. Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod in ipso esse Angeli in se considerato, non est differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adiunctas mutationes. Sed quod dicimus Angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse, differt secundum acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit esse Angeli per comparationem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum dicit Angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo eius oppositum non subditur divinae potentiae, cum vero dicit futurum esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde, cum esse et non esse Angeli subsit divinae potentiae, absolute considerando, potest Deus facere quod esse Angeli non sit futurum, tamen non potest facere quod non sit dum est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit. ||Reply to Objection 3. In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 5 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore. Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam alio, non est inconveniens. ||Reply to Objection 4. The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.
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| − | ||<div id="q10a6"><b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1 </b>Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in apocryphis Esdrae, maiestas et potestas aevorum est apud te, domine. ||Objection 1. It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord."
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2 </b>Praeterea, diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae. Sed quaedam aeviterna sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam vero sunt spirituales substantiae, scilicet Angeli. Non ergo est unum aevum tantum. ||Objection 2. Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3 </b>Praeterea, cum aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum est unum aevum, est una duratio. Sed non omnium aeviternorum est una duratio, quia quaedam post alia esse incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est ergo unum aevum tantum. ||Objection 3. Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4 </b>Praeterea, ea quae non dependent ab invicem, non videntur habere unam mensuram durationis, propter hoc enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum tempus, quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus motus, qui prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non dependent ab invicem, quia unus Angelus non est causa alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum tantum. ||Objection 4. Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 s. c. </b>Sed contra, aevum est simplicius tempore, et propinquius se habens ad aeternitatem. Sed tempus est unum tantum. Ergo multo magis aevum. ||On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 co. </b>Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio, quidam enim dicunt quod est unum aevum tantum; quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit, oportet considerare ex causa unitatis temporis, in cognitionem enim spiritualium per corporalia devenimus. Dicunt autem quidam esse unum tempus omnium temporalium, propter hoc quod est unus numerus omnium numeratorum, cum tempus sit numerus, secundum philosophum. Sed hoc non sufficit, quia tempus non est numerus ut abstractus extra numeratum, sed ut in numerato existens, alioquin non esset continuus; quia decem ulnae panni continuitatem habent, non ex numero, sed ex numerato. Numerus autem in numerato existens non est idem omnium, sed diversus diversorum. Unde alii assignant causam unitatis temporis ex unitate aeternitatis, quae est principium omnis durationis. Et sic, omnes durationes sunt unum, si consideretur earum principium, sunt vero multae, si consideretur diversitas eorum quae recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi principii. Alii vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte materiae primae, quae est primum subiectum motus, cuius mensura est tempus. Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur, quia ea quae sunt unum principio vel subiecto, et maxime remoto, non sunt unum simpliciter sed secundum quid. Est ergo ratio unitatis temporis, unitas primi motus, secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes alii mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sic ergo tempus ad illum motum comparatur non solum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sed etiam ut accidens ad subiectum; et sic ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura separata multa mensurari possunt. Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo quodam gradu et ordine et hoc videtur sentire Dionysius, qui dicit, cap. X Cael. Hier., quod inter substantias spirituales sunt primae, mediae et ultimae, etiam in uno ordine Angelorum. Secundum igitur primam opinionem, necesse est dicere quod sunt plura aeva, secundum quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum autem secundam opinionem, oportet dicere quod sit unum aevum tantum, quia, cum unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X Metaphys., oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur esse primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad praesens unum esse aevum tantum. ||I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things. Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured. This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (47, 2); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 ad 1 </b>Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro saeculo, quod est periodus durationis alicuius rei, et sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut multa saecula. ||Reply to Objection 1. Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 ad 2 </b>Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et spiritualia differant in genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc, quod habent esse intransmutabile. Et sic mensurantur aevo. ||Reply to Objection 2. Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 ad 3 </b>Ad tertium dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt, et tamen omnium est unum tempus, propter primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non omnia simul incipiant. ||Reply to Objection 3. All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.
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| − | ||<b>IЄ q. 10 a. 6 ad 4 </b>Ad quartum dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit simplicius. ||Reply to Objection 4. For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.
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