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===Pieces of the Puzzle=== | ===Pieces of the Puzzle=== | ||
| − | ''For the Time Being, a Sleightly Random Recap of Notes'' | + | ''For the Time Being, a Sleightly Random Recap of Notes …'' |
| + | |||
| + | ====Pragmatic Maxim as Closure Principle==== | ||
| + | |||
| + | <pre> | ||
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | ||
| + | |||
| + | Inquiry Driven Systems : Note 23 | ||
| + | |||
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | ||
| + | |||
| + | | Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you | ||
| + | | conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception | ||
| + | | of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Consider the following attempts at interpretation: | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1. Your concept of x is your concept of the practical effects of x. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Not exactly. It seems a bit more like: | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2. Your concept of x is your concept of your-conceived-practical-effects of x. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Converting to a third person point of view: | ||
| + | |||
| + | 3. j's concept of x is j's concept of j's-conceived-practical-effects of x. | ||
| + | |||
| + | An ordinary closure principle looks like this: | ||
| + | |||
| + | C(x) = C(C(x)) | ||
| + | |||
| + | It is tempting to try and read the pragmatic maxim | ||
| + | as if it had the following form, where C and E are | ||
| + | supposed to be a 1-adic functions for "concept of" | ||
| + | and "effects of", respectively. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1-adic functional case: | ||
| + | |||
| + | C(x) = C(E(x)) | ||
| + | |||
| + | But it is really more like: | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2-adic functional case: | ||
| + | |||
| + | C(y, x) = C(y, E(y, x)) | ||
| + | |||
| + | where: | ||
| + | |||
| + | 1. y = you. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 2. C(y, x) = the concept that you have of x. | ||
| + | |||
| + | 3. E(y, x) = the effects that you know of x. | ||
| + | |||
| + | x C(y, x) | ||
| + | o------------>o | ||
| + | /|\ ^ | ||
| + | / | \ = | ||
| + | / | \ = | ||
| + | / | \ = | ||
| + | e_1 e_2 e_3 = | ||
| + | \ | / = | ||
| + | \ | / = | ||
| + | \ | / = | ||
| + | \|/ = | ||
| + | o------------>o | ||
| + | E(y, x) C(y, E(y, x)) | ||
| + | |||
| + | The concept that you have of x | ||
| + | is the concept that you have of | ||
| + | the effects that you know of x. | ||
| + | |||
| + | It is also very likely that the functional interpretations will not | ||
| + | do the trick, and that 3-adic relations will need to be used instead. | ||
| + | |||
| + | o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o | ||
| + | </pre> | ||
| + | '''Source.''' [http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/suo/ontology/msg04316.html Jon Awbrey (08 Aug 2002), Ontology List, Peirce List]. | ||
Revision as of 15:21, 6 November 2008
Peircean Pragmata
Several recent blog postings have brought to mind a congeries of perennial themes out of Peirce. I am prompted to collect what old notes of mine I can glean off the Web, and — The Horror! The Horror! — maybe even plumb the verdimmerung depths of that old box of papyrus under the desk …
Peirce's Law : Tertia Datur And Non
Peirce's Law and the Pragmatic Maxim
Jacob Longshore conjectures a link between Peirce's Law and the Pragmatic Maxim.
- Peirce Lays Down The Law!
- Peirce's Pragmatic Law : A Conjecture
- Extensions on Peirce's Pragmatic Law
- Further Extensions : Out on the Leafy Edge
- Peirce's Pragmatic Law : The Point of It All
Jon Awbrey freely associates to Post N°3.
Pieces of the Puzzle
For the Time Being, a Sleightly Random Recap of Notes …
Pragmatic Maxim as Closure Principle
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
Inquiry Driven Systems : Note 23
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
| Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you
| conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception
| of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.
Consider the following attempts at interpretation:
1. Your concept of x is your concept of the practical effects of x.
Not exactly. It seems a bit more like:
2. Your concept of x is your concept of your-conceived-practical-effects of x.
Converting to a third person point of view:
3. j's concept of x is j's concept of j's-conceived-practical-effects of x.
An ordinary closure principle looks like this:
C(x) = C(C(x))
It is tempting to try and read the pragmatic maxim
as if it had the following form, where C and E are
supposed to be a 1-adic functions for "concept of"
and "effects of", respectively.
1-adic functional case:
C(x) = C(E(x))
But it is really more like:
2-adic functional case:
C(y, x) = C(y, E(y, x))
where:
1. y = you.
2. C(y, x) = the concept that you have of x.
3. E(y, x) = the effects that you know of x.
x C(y, x)
o------------>o
/|\ ^
/ | \ =
/ | \ =
/ | \ =
e_1 e_2 e_3 =
\ | / =
\ | / =
\ | / =
\|/ =
o------------>o
E(y, x) C(y, E(y, x))
The concept that you have of x
is the concept that you have of
the effects that you know of x.
It is also very likely that the functional interpretations will not
do the trick, and that 3-adic relations will need to be used instead.
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
Source. Jon Awbrey (08 Aug 2002), Ontology List, Peirce List.