Directory:Logic Museum/Boethius' Translation of the Perihermenias - Revision history

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← Older revision		Revision as of 08:38, 24 October 2009
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	have to translate the corresponding abstract terms such as 'negatio' by the English abstract term 'negation', leading		have to translate the corresponding abstract terms such as 'negatio' by the English abstract term 'negation', leading
	to the impression that there are a different family of words, where in Latin there is just one family.		to the impression that there are a different family of words, where in Latin there is just one family.
		+	[[Category:Logic Museum Parallel Texts]]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 '''BOETHIUS' TRANSLATION OF THE PERIHERMANEIAS'''
-* [[#c1|Chapter 1]].  The spoken word is a symbol of thought.<br>
+*[[#c1|Chapter 1]].  The spoken word is a symbol of thought.
-<a href = "#c2">Chapter 2</a>.  Definition of noun<br>
+*[[#c2|Chapter 2]].  Definition of noun
-<a href = "#c3">Chapter 3</a>.  Definition of verb<br>
+*[[#c3|Chapter 3]].  Definition of verb
-<a href = "#c4">Chapter 4</a>.  Definition of sentence<br>
+*[[#c4|Chapter 4]].  Definition of sentence
-<a href = "#c5">Chapter 5</a>.  Simple and compound propositions<br>
+*[[#c5|Chapter 5]].  Simple and compound propositions
-<a href = "#c6">Chapter 6</a>.  Contradictory propositions<br>
+*[[#c6|Chapter 6]].  Contradictory propositions
-<a href = "#c7">Chapter 7</a>.  Universal, indefinite and particular propositions.  Contrary propositions<br>
+*[[#c7|Chapter 7]].  Universal, indefinite and particular propositions.  Contrary propositions
-<a href = "#c8">Chapter 8</a>.  Definition of single propositions.<br>
+*[[#c8|Chapter 8]].  Definition of single propositions.
-<a href = "#c9">Chapter 9</a>.  Propositions which refer to present, past and future<br>
+*[[#c9|Chapter 9]].  Propositions which refer to present, past and future
-<a href = "#c10">Chapter 10</a>.  Pairs of affirmations and denials<br>
+*[[#c10|Chapter 10]].  Pairs of affirmations and denials
-<a href = "#c11">Chapter 11</a>.  Apparently simple propositions which are really compound<br>
+*[[#c11|Chapter 11]].  Apparently simple propositions which are really compound
-<a href = "#c12">Chapter 12</a>.  Propositions concerning necessity and posssibility.<br>
+*[[#c12|Chapter 12]].  Propositions concerning necessity and posssibility.
-<a href = "#c13">Chapter 13</a>.  Relation between such propositions.<br>
+*[[#c13|Chapter 13]].  Relation between such propositions.
-<a href = "#c14">Chapter 14</a>.  Contrary affirmations and denials<br>
+*[[#c14|Chapter 14]].  Contrary affirmations and denials
 == Introduction ==

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 '''BOETHIUS' TRANSLATION OF THE PERIHERMANEIAS'''
-<a href = "#c1">Chapter 1</a>.  The spoken word is a symbol of thought.<br>
+* [[#c1|Chapter 1]].  The spoken word is a symbol of thought.<br>
 <a href = "#c2">Chapter 2</a>.  Definition of noun<br>
 <a href = "#c3">Chapter 3</a>.  Definition of verb<br>

@@ Line 175: / Line 175: @@
                </td> <td>
                </td> </tr>
-== Chapter 1 ==
+<tr> <td>
-<tr> <td>    <b>[01]</b> Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et affirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio.
+<div id="c1">Chapter 1</div>
                </td> <td>    First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation', then 'proposition' and 'sentence.'

@@ Line 168: / Line 168: @@
 <hr>
 <b>Aristotle's Perhermaneias.  Latin translatin by Boethius, English translation by Edghill.</b><p>
 <table border cellpadding = 10 span = 2>
@@ Line 176: / Line 175: @@
                </td> <td>
                </td> </tr>
-<tr> <td>     <a name = "c1"><b>[01]</b> Primum oportet constituere quid sit nomen et quid verbum, postea quid est negatio et affirmatio et enuntiatio et oratio.
+== Chapter 1 ==
                </td> <td>    First we must define the terms 'noun' and 'verb', then the terms 'denial' and 'affirmation', then 'proposition' and 'sentence.'
@@ Line 191: / Line 191: @@
                </td> </tr>
-<tr> <td>     <a name = "c2"><b>[02]</b> DE NOMINE Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata; in 'equiferus' enim 'ferus' nihil per se significat, quemadmodum in oratione quae est 'equus ferus'. At vero non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus, sic se habet et in compositis; in illis enim nullo modo pars significativa est, in his autem vult quidem sed nullius separati, ut in 'equiferus' <'ferus'>.
+</table>
                </td> <td>    By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. In the noun 'Fairsteed,' the part 'steed' has no significance in and by itself, as in the phrase 'fair steed.' Yet there is a difference between simple and composite nouns; for in the former the part is in no way significant, in the latter it contributes to the meaning of the whole, although it has not an independent meaning. Thus in the word 'pirate-boat' the word 'boat' has no meaning except as part of the whole word.
@@ Line 204: / Line 207: @@
                </td> <td>    The expressions 'of Philo', 'to Philo', and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the noun proper, but, when coupled with 'is', 'was', or will be', they do not, as they are, form a proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under these conditions. Take the words 'of Philo is' or 'of or 'of Philo is not'; these words do not, as they stand, form either a true or a false proposition.
                </td> </tr>
-<tr> <td>     <a name = "c3"><b>[03]</b> DE VERBO Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra significat; et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota.
+<tr> <td>     == Chapter 3 == <b>[03]</b> DE VERBO Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus, cuius pars nihil extra significat; et est semper eorum quae de altero praedicantur nota.
                </td> <td>    A verb is that which, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time. No part of it has any independent meaning, and it is a sign of something said of something else.
                </td> </tr>

@@ Line 692: / Line 692: @@
 </table>
-<hr>
+== Notes ==
+{{Reflist}}
 <p><a name= "note3">[3]  Leading to a difficulty in English of translating related words such as those for negation,

@@ Line 170: / Line 170: @@
 <table rules = groups>
 <table border cellpadding = 10 span = 2>
-<COL width=45%>
 <tr> <th>Latin</th><th>English</th>
-</tr> </thead> <tbody>
+</tr>
 <tr> <td>     ARISTOTELES: DE INTERPRETATIONE
                </td> <td>
@@ Line 692: / Line 690: @@
                </td> <td>    It is evident, also, that neither true judgements nor true propositions can be contrary the one to the other. For whereas, when two propositions are true, a man may state both at the same time without inconsistency, contrary propositions are those which state contrary conditions, and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and the same time in the same subject.
                </td> </tr>
-</tbody> </table>
+</table>
 <br> <br> <br>

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
-<body lang=EN-GB style='font-family:Garamond'>
+'''BOETHIUS' TRANSLATION OF THE PERIHERMANEIAS'''
 <a href = "#c1">Chapter 1</a>.  The spoken word is a symbol of thought.<br>
 <a href = "#c2">Chapter 2</a>.  Definition of noun<br>
@@ Line 69: / Line 66: @@
 Note that only once does Boethius use the word 'propositio'for what Edghill translates as 'the admission of a premiss'<ref> Cicero invented some of the Latin equivalents for Greek terms, such as <i>propositio</i>, meaning the leading premiss of an argument, which contrasts with <i>assumptio</i> meaning the additional premiss.  Kneale (p. 178) claims that 'propositio' was used by Quintilian in the more general sense of 'statement' or 'indicative sentence', in which it was used throughout the middle ages</ref>.  However, later writers such is Ockham preferred 'proposition', which is the ancestor of our modern 'proposition'.
-<p>2.  Spoken words are signs of mental modifications (Boethius: <i>notae passionum anima</i> - literally passions or modifications of the soul).
+.  Spoken words are signs of mental modifications (Boethius: <i>notae passionum anima</i> - literally passions or modifications of the soul).
 While the signs are not necessarily the same (i.e. if the written or spoken languages are different)
 these modifications are the same in all people (<i>eaedem omnibus passiones animae sunt</i>).
 This later developed into the idea, defended by Ockham and Buridan and others, that spoken propositions,
 i.e. sentences, represent mental propositions of which they are the outward signs.
-<p>
 .  Universal signs are 'of a nature' to be predicated of many.
 The Latin formula was <i>universale quod in pluribus natum est praedicari</i>, repeated by writers of logic textbooks
 such as Peter of Spain and a hundred others since.
 .  An affirmation is a assertion of something about something (<i>affirmatio vero est enuntiatio alicuius de aliquo</i>),
 a denial is an assertion of something "from" something (<i>negatio vero enuntiatio alicuius ab aliquo</i>).
@@ Line 88: / Line 84: @@
 to deny<sup><a href = "#note3">[3]</a></sup>.
-<p>5.  Every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation
+.  Every affirmation has an opposite denial, and similarly every denial an opposite affirmation
 (<i>omni affirmationi est negatio opposita et omni negationi affirmatio</i>).  This was the basis of the well-known
 'square of opposition' - see below.
-<p>6.  The distinction between singular and general propositions.
+.  The distinction between singular and general propositions.
-<p>7.  The idea of 'wide scope' or 'sentence' negation. Aristotle says that a denial must deny exactly whatthe affirmation affirms,
+.  The idea of 'wide scope' or 'sentence' negation. Aristotle says that a denial must deny exactly whatthe affirmation affirms,
 (<i>idem oportet negare negationem quod affirmavit affirmatio</i>)
 .   In the case of that which is or which has taken place, either the affirmation or the denial is true or false.
 (<i>In his ergo quae sunt et facta sunt necesse est affirmationem vel negationem veram vel falsam esse</i>).
@@ Line 105: / Line 100: @@
 unavoidably true, and that what will happen in the future will happen by necessity.
-<p>
+== The Square of Opposition ==
-The idea that there are certain logical relationships between the four kinds of Aristotelian proposition,
+The idea that there are certain logical relationships between the four kinds of Aristotelian proposition, when they have the same subject and predicate, is developed in chapters [[#c6|>six]] and [[#c7"|seven]].  It became the basis of a diagram originating with Boethius and used by medieval logicians to classify these possible logical relations.  The four propositions - the universal affirmative ('every man is just'), the universal negative ('no man is just'), the particular affirmative ('some man is just') and the particular negative ('some man is not just') - are placed in the four corners of a square, and the relations represented as lines drawn between them.
-<p>Pairs of propositions are called <i>contradictories</i> (contradictoriae) when they cannot at the same time both be true or both be false,
+Pairs of propositions are called <i>contradictories</i> (contradictoriae) when they cannot at the same time both be true or both be false, <i>contraries</i> (contrariae) when both cannot at the same time be true, <i>subcontraries</i> (subcontrariae) when both cannot at the same time be false, and <i>subalternates</i> (subalternae) when the truth of the one proposition implies the truth of the other, but not conversely.  The corresponding relations are known as contradiction (contradictio), contrariety (contrarietas), subcontrariety (subcontrarietas) and subalternation (subalternatio).
 Thus
-<p>* Universal statements are contraries: 'every man is just' and 'no man is just' cannot be true together, although one may be true and the other false,
+* Universal statements are contraries: 'every man is just' and 'no man is just' cannot be true together, although one may be true and the other false, and also both may be false (if one at least man is not just, and at least one man is not just).
-and also both may be false (if one at least man is not just, and at least one man is not just).
+* Particular statements are subcontraries.  'Some man is just' and 'some man is not just' cannot be false together
 * The universal affirmative and the particular affirmative are subalternates, because in Aristotelian semantics 'every A is B' implies 'some A is B'.  This fact has caused endless controversy since the middle of the nineteenth century, following the development of modern semantics where there is no such implication.  Similarly the universal negative and the particular negative are subalternates since, again, 'no A is B' was thought to imply 'some A is not B'.
-<p>* The universal affirmative and the particular negative are contradictories.  Clearly if some A is not B,
+* The universal affirmative and the particular negative are contradictories.  Clearly if some A is not B,
 not every A is B.  Conversely, though this is not intuitive for modern semantics, it was thought that if every A is not B,
 some A is not B.  This interpretation has also caused much controversy.  Note that Aristotle's Greek does not
@@ Line 141: / Line 118: @@
 follows him.  However, in Boethius commentary on the Perihermaneias,
 he renders the particular negative as 'quidam A non est B', literally 'a certain A is not a B',
-which under any ordinary reading of the Latin (see Lewis and Short, e.g.) is existential, implying the existence of
+which under any ordinary reading of the Latin (see Lewis and Short, e.g.) is existential, implying the existence of a particular A which is not a B.  Terence Parsons has suggested ([http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square here]) that the Latin 'quidam A non est B' does not have existential import, but this seems implausible, given that it means that a certain, or a particular A, is not B.
 <blockquote>
 <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="">
@@ Line 179: / Line 151: @@
-<p><b>Hyperlinks</b>
+== Hyperlinks ==
 Another advantage of using Boethius' Latin is that medieval commentators on Aristotle refer to this translation, or very similar translations, in making references.
@@ Line 189: / Line 160: @@
 we have the much easier way of using the hyperlink to take us there.  No heavy books, no leafing through pages of indecipherable contractions.  Progress indeed.
-<p>I am developing a set of pages in the Logic Museum consisting of medieval commentaries
+I am developing a set of pages in the Logic Museum consisting of medieval commentaries (such as by Aquinas, Abelard and Boethius himself) on the Perihermaneias.
-<p><hr><b>References</b> <p>
+== References ==
 Kneale, W. & M., <i>The Development of Logic</i>, Oxford, 1971